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Charles Trevelyan, John Mitchel and the 
historiography of the Great Famine 
Christophe GILLISSEN 
Université de Caen – Basse Normandie 
The Great Irish Famine produced a staggering amount of paperwork: 
innumerable letters, reports, articles, tables of statistics and books were written to 
cover the catastrophe. Yet two distinct voices emerge from the hubbub: those of 
Charles Trevelyan, a British civil servant who supervised relief operations during 
the Famine, and John Mitchel, an Irish nationalist who blamed London for the many 
Famine-related deaths.1 They may be considered as representative to some extent, 
albeit in an extreme form, of two dominant trends within its historiography as far as 
London’s role during the Famine is concerned. Indeed, revisionists generally 
downplay Britain’s responsibility, stressing the fact that the Famine was a natural 
disaster of unprecedented scale and that the British Government deployed 
extraordinary means to deal with it, though admittedly with limited success. 
Nationalists and post-revisionists on the other hand consider that London failed to 
live up to its duty to protect the Irish, whom it perceived as second-class subjects of 
the United Kingdom, and who thus could not avail themselves of the full resources 
of the Exchequer of the most developed nation of its time. 
In order to better understand the issues, the article will first look at Trevelyan 
and Mitchel’s interpretations of the Great Famine, before turning to later 
developments in the writing of its history: the first scholarly works on the subject, 
the emergence of revisionism, Irish reluctance to come to terms with the Famine, 
and the outpouring of new work since its 150th anniversary.  
Charles Trevelyan 
Charles Edward Trevelyan was Assistant Secretary to the Treasury from 1840 
to 1859 – in other words, its highest-ranking civil servant, working under the direct 
authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Trevelyan’s influence over relief 
operations in Ireland must not be underestimated, especially as the various 
departments involved – the Board of Works, the Poor Law Commissioners, and the 
Commissariat – all depended more or less directly on the Treasury.2 Trevelyan’s 
                                                          
1 See Laurent COLANTONIO, ‘La Grande Famine en Irlande (1846-1851) : objet d’histoire, 
enjeu de mémoire’, Revue historique, No. 664, October 2007, pp. 899-925. Available at: 
<http://www.cairn.info/revue-historique-2007-4-page-899.htm>. 
2 Robert B. McDOWELL, ‘Administration and the public services, 1800-70’, pp. 538-561 in 
William E. VAUGHAN (ed.), A New History of Ireland, Vol. V: Ireland under the Union (1): 
1801-70, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 559.  
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control over the administration of relief became almost total after the Conservative 
Prime Minister, Robert Peel, resigned in June 1846 and a Whig government was 
formed under the leadership of Lord John Russell. Indeed, whereas Peel – widely 
recognised as the best statesman of his generation – had first-hand experience of 
Ireland and did not hesitate to take quick and decisive measures, Russell did not 
have comparable leadership skills and was constrained by an uncertain majority in 
Parliament. A weak government gives more scope to active senior civil servants, and 
Trevelyan was exceptional in terms both of his capacity to work long hours and of 
his self-assurance. In addition, as a ‘partisan Whig’ he was ideologically closer to 
his political masters after June 1846, notably in the case of the Chancellor, Charles 
Wood.3 This resulted in ‘a dominant set of views [which] formed the basis from 
which the cabinet approached the problem of Irish distress’.4 Those views, which 
were shaped in particular by providentialism and laissez-faire, led to the conclusion 
that the best way to deal with the famine was for the Government to limit itself to 
providing employment on public works while distribution of food should be left to 
private charities, with the possible exception of remote areas; as to the cost of relief, 
it was to be borne by Ireland.  
In January 1848, Trevelyan wrote an anonymous article, published in the 
Edinburgh Review.5 Considering that the crisis in Ireland was over, he delivered a 
robust defence of British relief policy: he stressed the scale of the challenge as well 
as the difficulty of implementing effective measures, emphasised the generosity of 
British donors, and concluded on the success of Government measures. On the 
whole it is a remarkable text, covering much ground and marshalling numerous 
arguments; it certainly testifies to Trevelyan’s talents as an administrator. Yet it 
expresses little sensitivity to the plight of the hungry who are almost entirely absent 
from its pages, the author’s main concern being to demonstrate his adherence to the 
economic orthodoxy of the day: 
First, it has been proved to demonstration, that local distress cannot 
be relieved out of national funds without great abuses and evils, 
tending, by a direct and rapid process, to an entire disorganisation of 
society. This is, in effect, to expose the common stock to a general 
scramble. All are interested in getting as much as they can. It is 
nobody’s concern to put a check on the expenditure. If the poor man 
prefers idling on relief works or being rationed with his wife and 
children, to hard labour; if the farmer discharges his labourers and 
makes the state of things a plea for not paying rates or rent; if the 
landed proprietor joins in the common cry, hoping to obtain some 
present advantage, and trusting to the chance of escaping future 
repayments, it is not the men, but the system, which is in fault. Ireland 
is not the only country which would have been thrown off its balance 
by the attraction of “public money” à discretion. This false principle 
                                                          
3 Peter GRAY, Famine, Land and Politics: British Government and Irish Society, 1843-50, 
Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1999, pp. 24-26. 
4 Gearóid Ó TUATHAIGH, Ireland Before the Famine, 1798-1848 [1972], Dublin: Gill & 
Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1990, p. 189. 
5 ‘The Irish Crisis’, Edinburgh Review, Vol. 87, no. 175, January 1848, pp. 229-320. 
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eats like a canker into the moral health and physical prosperity of the 
people. All classes “make a poor mouth,” as it is expressively called 
in Ireland. They conceal their advantages, exaggerate their 
difficulties, and relax their exertions. The cotter does not sow his 
holding, the proprietor does not employ his poor in improving his 
estate, because by doing so they would disentitle themselves to their 
“share of the relief.”6 
While an assistant secretary to the Treasury must ensure the proper use of 
public money, such a passage written as hundreds of thousands of Irishmen were 
close to death reflects a singular indifference to the sufferings of fellow citizens. 
Trevelyan firmly believed the Government had been right to refuse to interfere in 
the workings of the food trade, quoting the Lord Lieutenant to the effect that the 
Irish market was ‘freer, cheaper, and better supplied, than that of any country in 
Europe where distress prevailed, and where those measures of interference and 
restriction had been unwisely adopted which were successfully resisted here’.7 He 
also presented the winding down of public works in 1847 as part of a successful 
strategy, allowing Irish farmers to prepare the next harvest: 
the Government, seeing that the time suited for agricultural operations 
was rapidly passing away, and that the utmost exertions made on the 
spot had failed in keeping the numbers in check, took the matter into 
its own hands, and directed that on the 20th March, 20 per cent of the 
persons employed should be struck off the lists; after which, successive 
reductions were ordered, proportioned to the progress made in 
bringing the new system of relief into operation in each district. These 
orders were obeyed, and the crisis passed without any disturbance of 
the public peace or any perceptible aggravation of the distress. The 
necessary labour was returned to agriculture, and the foundation was 
laid of the late abundant harvest in Ireland, by which the downward 
progress of that country has been mercifully stayed, and new strength 
and spirits have been given for working out her regeneration.8  
All that was part of an extremely optimistic assessment of the situation, and an 
Englishman reading it at the time would obviously have concluded that the Famine 
in Ireland was over and that he could be proud of his country’s achievement. He 
would have felt that the man who had supervised the administration of those relief 
operations was worthy of a knighthood for his services, which Trevelyan was duly 
awarded a few weeks later, on 27 April 1848.  
The Edinburgh Review, a Whig organ, published several other pieces on 
Ireland and the famine by like-minded thinkers, such as Nassau William Senior, one 
                                                          
6 Charles Edward TREVELYAN, The Irish Crisis, London: Longman, Brown, Green & 
Longmans, 1848, pp. 183-184 (the article from the Edinburgh Review was published later in 
the year in book form, under the author’s name). 
7 Ibid., p. 74. 
8 Ibid., p. 65. 
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of the most influential intellectuals of his time.9 The gist was that public relief was 
not only useless but counterproductive, since it would encourage the Irish – 
landlords and tenants alike – to remain idle instead of taking action to improve their 
lot. Any attempt to interfere in the workings of the market, be it by banning exports 
of food or by using public money to feed the hungry, would stifle private enterprise 
and wreak havoc with the country’s economy. More generally, there was the idea 
that Irish society and agriculture were fundamentally unsustainable and required a 
major overhaul if they were not to remain a permanent burden on the Exchequer. 
They had proved impossible to reform in previous decades despite the best efforts of 
the British Government, but the Famine provided a unique opportunity to reshape 
them. Even though that entailed large-scale evictions and emigration, it was the only 
way to bring about any lasting improvement. As Trevelyan explained in a letter to 
Lord Monteagle (Thomas Spring Rice), an Irish landlord and Whig politician, in 
October 1846: 
I think I see a bright light shining in the distance through the dark 
cloud which at present hangs over Ireland. A remedy has already been 
applied to that portion of the maladies of Ireland which was traceable 
to political causes, and the morbid habits which still to a certain extent 
survive are gradually giving way to more healthy action. The deep and 
inveterate root of social evil remains, and I hope I am not guilty of 
irreverence in thinking that, this being altogether beyond the power of 
man, the cure has been applied by the direct stroke of an all-wise 
Providence in a manner as unexpected and unthought as it is likely to 
be effectual.10  
John Mitchel 
On the other side of the Irish Sea, such an attitude was seen by some as part of 
a deliberate attempt to cull the Irish population. In 1848 Charles Gavan Duffy, the 
founder of The Nation, presented the Famine as ‘a fearful murder committed on the 
mass of the people’.11 John Mitchel, who wrote for The Nation, eventually broke 
with the more moderate element of the Young Ireland movement in 1847 to found a 
revolutionary paper, the United Irishman. His inflamed articles against British rule 
in Ireland resulted in his conviction for treason in 1848, and he was transported to 
Bermuda before being transferred to Van Diemen’s Land, a penal colony off the 
Australian coast. In 1853 he managed to escape to the United States, where he 
published a book that had long-lasting influence on nationalist interpretations of the 
Famine: The Last Conquest of Ireland (Perhaps), which was originally serialised in 
an American newspaper in 1858, before being published in book form in 1860. It is 
a history of Ireland during the 1840s, or, as Mitchel puts it,  
                                                          
9 See Nassau William SENIOR, Journals, Conversations, and Essays relating to Ireland, 2 
vol., London: Longmans, Green and C°, 1868. 
10 9 October 1846, quoted in Noel KISSANE, The Irish Famine: a documentary history, 
Dublin: National Library of Ireland, 1995, p. 51. 
11 Robert DUDLEY EDWARDS and Thomas Desmond WILLIAMS (eds), The Great 
Famine: Studies in Irish History, 1845-53 [1956], ed. Cormac Ó GRÁDA, Dublin: Lilliput 
Press, 1994, p. vii. 
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the story of an ancient nation stricken down by a war more ruthless 
and sanguinary than any seven years’ war, or thirty years’ war, that 
Europe ever saw. No sack of Madgeburg, or ravage of the Palatinate, 
ever approached in horror and  esolation to the slaughters done in 
Ireland by mere official red tape and stationery, and the principles of 
political economy.12 
From his point of view, London was responsible for the death of 1.5 million 
people. One of his main arguments was that Ireland produced more than enough to 
feed the entire population of Ireland, and that a ban on exports of food – similar to 
those introduced in other European countries at the time – would have sufficed to 
prevent the Famine. His indignation permeates almost every page of his book, 
notably the conclusion which contains a famous line denouncing providentialist 
accounts of the Famine: 
Now, that million and a half of men, women, and children, were 
carefully, prudently, and peacefully slain by the English government. 
They died of hunger in the midst of abundance, which their own 
hands created; and it is quite immaterial to distinguish those who 
perish in the agonies of famine itself from those who died of typhus 
fever, which in Ireland is always caused by famine. 
Further, I have called it an artificial famine: that is to say, it was a 
famine which desolated a rich and fertile island, that produced every 
year abundance and superabundance to sustain all her people and 
many more. The English, indeed, call that famine a “dispensation of 
Providence;” and ascribe it entirely to the blight of the potatoes. But 
potatoes failed in like manner all over Europe; yet there was no famine 
save in Ireland. The British account of the matter, then, is first, a fraud 
– second, a blasphemy. The Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, 
but the English created the famine.13 
In following decades, Mitchel’s interpretation gained ground among Irish 
nationalists. Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin, a radical nationalist party of 
the early 20th century, viewed the Great Famine as an attempt by the British to 
exterminate the Celts of Ireland, and even as late as in 1952 this nationalist brand of 
history was pursued by P. S. O’Hegarty in his history of the Union: ‘In the known 
facts of the business there is justification for the view that the Government policy 
under which over a million died, and over a million emigrated in five years, was a 
deliberate policy of extermination’.14 Among his arguments, the issue of food 
exports looms large; he quotes for instance a letter from the parish priest of Kells 
published in The Nation on 25 October 1845:  
                                                          
12 John MITCHEL, The Last Conquest of Ireland (Perhaps) [1861], ed. Patrick MAUME, 
Dublin: UCD Press, 2005, p. 218. 
13 Ibid., p. 219. 
14 Patrick Sarsfield O’HEGARTY, A History of Ireland under the Union, 1801-1922, London: 
Methuen, 1952, p. 328. 
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With starvation at our doors, grimly staring us, vessels laden with our 
sole hopes of existence, our provisions, are hourly wafted from our 
every port. From one milling establishment I have last night seen not 
less than fifty dray loads of meal moving on to Drogheda, thence to go 
to feed the foreigner, leaving starvation and death the sure and certain 
fate of the toil and sweat that raised this food.15 
More recently, Tim Pat Coogan, a renowned journalist and best-selling writer 
on Irish history, has developed this reading of the Famine in connection with the 
United Nations’ definition of genocide in its 1948 Convention. His line is that ‘Whig 
policy was directed at getting the peasants off the land, and if it took mass death to 
achieve that objective, so be it’.16 Among the evidence to justify that view are 
various statements and letters by British policy-makers, and in particular two 
anonymous letters written by Trevelyan to the Morning Chronicle in October 1843. 
He had just sojourned in Ireland for six weeks prior to Daniel O’Connell’s mass 
political rally against the Union in Clontarf – which was banned at the eleventh hour 
– and he came to believe that a mass uprising was imminent. He was convinced that 
military preparations were under way all over the island and he accused the Roman 
Catholic clergy of manipulating the people to that end. It may be that the Irish were 
only too happy to pull the leg of the intense, humourless Englishman: standing out 
from the crowd, making all-too-obvious inquiries, he would have been an irresistible 
target for ‘the favourite Irish sport of “codding” a stranger.’17  
But the episode reveals another trait of the Assistant Secretary’s character: on 
his return from Dublin, he had a meeting with Peel, the Prime Minister, and James 
Graham, the Home Secretary, during which he developed his suspicions concerning 
Ireland. Contrary to all normal practice, he then published that confidential 
information in the press, to the fury of his ministers. Upbraided by Graham after the 
first letter was published, he nonetheless persevered and had the second published as 
well. The event illustrates his determination to pursue his own agenda, against the 
orders of his political masters if need be. Trevelyan has thus become the villain in 
nationalist interpretations of the Famine and even as late as in 1979 a folk ballad, 
The Fields of Athenry, could still be written about the story of a man convicted 
during the Great Famine for ‘stealing Trevelyan’s corn’.18  
Early histories 
Other, more scholarly approaches to the Great Famine had been explored, 
however, as soon as 1874, when Canon John O’Rourke, the parish priest of 
Maynooth, wrote a detailed account based on numerous interviews, reports and 
official sources, including Trevelyan’s Irish Crisis. He disagreed with many of its 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p. 239. 
16 Tim Pat COOGAN, The Famine Plot: England’s Role in Ireland’s Greatest Tragedy, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 230.  
17 Cecil WOODHAM-SMITH, The Great Hunger: Ireland, 1845-9 [1962], London: Four 
Square Books, 1965, p. 55.  
18 Written by Pete St John and first recorded by Danny Doyle in 1979, it has become a 
popular anthem for many Irish sports supporters. 
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conclusions, however, and was often quite critical of British policy. For instance, the 
notorious Gregory clause – an amendment to the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act of 1847 
proposed by William Gregory, a Tory MP with an estate in Co. Galway, compelling 
all people occupying a quarter of an acre of land or more to surrender their plots if 
they wished to obtain public relief – led to a denunciation in no uncertain words: ‘A 
more complete engine for the slaughter and expatriation of a people was never 
designed’:  
The previous clause offered facilities for emigrating to those who 
would give up their land – the quarter-acre-clause compelled them to 
give it up, or die of hunger. In the fullness of his generosity Mr. 
Gregory had, he said, originally intended to insert ‘half an acre’ in the 
clause, but, like many well-intentioned men, he was over-ruled: he 
had, he said, been lately in Ireland, and people there who had more 
knowledge of the subject than he could lay claim to, told him half an 
acre was too extensive, so he made it a quarter of an acre. It is not 
hard to conjecture who his advisers were on this occasion.19 
Small farmers were indeed forced to abandon all they had, ending up in total 
destitution. O’Rourke also criticised the paltry sums spent by London to alleviate the 
effects of the famine in comparison with what it was willing to disburse in time of 
war. The Spectator, in a review of the book, regretted what it considered ‘unfair 
strokes of partisanship’, but agreed that ‘Sir Robert Peel’s and Lord John Russell’s 
Governments entirely failed, until it was too late, to grasp the magnitude of the 
calamity which was impending’.20 O’Rourke’s overall assessment of Government 
policy, highlighting its lack of ‘promptness and decision’, may be considered as a 
nationalist interpretation, yet he rejected the accusation of genocide, emphasising 
both the scale of the challenge and the reality of relief efforts:  
To have met the Potato Famine with anything like complete success, 
would have been a Herculean task for any government. The total 
failure of the food of a nation was [...] a fact new in history; such 
being the case, no machinery existed extensive enough to neutralize its 
effects, nor was there extant any plan upon which such machinery 
could be modelled. Great allowance must be therefore made for the 
shortcomings of the Government, in a crisis so new and so terrible; but 
after making the most liberal concessions on this head, it must be 
admitted that Lord John Russell and his colleagues were painfully 
unequal to the situation. They either could not or would not use all the 
appliances within their reach, to save the Irish people. Besides the 
mistakes they made as to the nature of the employment which ought to 
be given, a chief fault of their’s was that they did not take time by the 
forelock – that they did not act with promptness and decision. Other 
nations, where famine was far less imminent, were in the markets, and 
                                                          
19 John O’ROURKE, The History of the Great Irish Famine of 1847 With Notices of Earlier 
Irish Famines [1874], Dublin: James Duffy, 3rd ed. 1902, p. 331. 
20 The Spectator, No. 2499, 20 May 1876, p. 18. 
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had to a great extent made their purchases before our Government, 
causing food to be scarcer and dearer for us than it needed to be.21 
There were other attempts at writing histories of the Great Famine in following 
decades, such as W. P. O’Brien’s The Great Famine in Ireland published in 1896.22 
He was not an historian either, but a Poor Law inspector, and his book relies heavily 
on Trevelyan’s account which he considered essential reading, based as it was on the 
author’s ‘official access to the best ources of information’ on the subject.23 In 1921, 
George O’Brien, who later taught economics at University College Dublin, 
published The Economic History of Ireland from the Union to the Famine. The 
chapters devoted to the Famine, though largely based on the 1851 Census report and 
on Trevelyan’s Irish Crisis, make some of the same points as O’Rourke. He 
underlines for instance the excessive optimism of Trevelyan’s account, quoting 
George Poulett Scrope, a geologist turned MP, who had derided it on the grounds 
that ‘a stranger to the real events of the last two years might read through the whole 
hundred pages without even finding out that during the “Irish Crisis” several 
hundred thousand souls perished in Ireland of want, through the inefficiency of 
those “colossal” relief measures.’24  
In 1947, at the time of the centenary, a Vincentian priest, Timothy O’Herlihy, 
tried to outline new possibilities for further research on the subject.25 For instance, 
he proposed an alternative providentialist interpretation, arguing that the Famine-
induced Irish diaspora helped to spread Catholicism in the United States and in 
Commonwealth countries, and to consolidate it in England and Scotland where it 
was close to extinction; he also suggested ‘comparisons with contemporary food 
shortages in post-war Europe’ to better understand the Great Irish Famine.26 
Revisionism 
It was only from the mid-1930s onwards that a new generation of Irish 
historians, led by Theodore William Moody and Robert Dudley Edwards, sought to 
develop a professional approach to their field. Among their objectives, they aimed at 
dispelling politically-oriented readings of history in general, and nationalist myths in 
                                                          
21 O’ROURKE, The History of the Great Irish Famine, op. cit., pp. 196-197. 
22 William Patrick O’BRIEN, The Great Famine in Ireland and a Retrospect of the Fifty 
Years, 1845-95; with a sketch of the present condition and future prospects of the congested 
districts, London: Downey, 1896. 
23 Mary E. DALY, ‘Revisionism and Irish History: The Great Famine’, pp. 71-89 in D. 
George BOYCE and Alan O’DAY (eds), The Making of Irish History: Revisionism and the 
Revisionist Controversy, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 72. 
24 George O’BRIEN, An Economic History of Ireland from the Union to the Famine, London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1921, p. 261. 
25 Timothy O’HERLIHY, The Famine, 1845-47: A Survey of its Ravages and Causes, 
Drogheda: Drogheda Independent Co., 1947. 
26 Vincent COMERFORD, ‘Grievance, Scourge or Shame? The Complexity of Attitudes to 
Ireland’s Great Famine’, pp. 51-74 in Christian NOACK, Lindsay JANSSEN, and Vincent 
COMERFORD (eds), Holodomor and Gorta Mór: Histories, Memories and Representations 
of Famine in Ukraine and Ireland, London: Anthem Press, 2012, pp. 58-9. 
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particular.27 Through a dispassionate study of sources, they hoped to establish a 
value-free history, in contrast to books like Mitchel’s The Last Conquest for 
instance. 
The Great Famine, with its inherently controversial Anglo-Irish dimension, did 
not fit in easily with that revisionist agenda, however, and later historians noted that 
the journal founded by Moody and Dudley Edwards, Irish Historical Studies, only 
published five articles on the Famine during its first 50 years.28 Yet in 1944, when 
the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera – a prominent nationalist leader, brought up on 
tales of Famine suffering in Bruree, his childhood village –, proposed that a book be 
published to mark the centenary of the Famine in 1945, Moody and Dudley Edwards 
were asked to edit it.29 Beyond the many favourable reviews it received, the main 
achievement of the book from a revisionist perspective was that it conveyed 
‘successfully to the wider reading public’ that ‘the modern scholarly study of 
history’ was not ‘a closed exercise in ational self-justification’.30 More generally, it 
may be saluted as the first serious attempt by Irish academia to grapple with the 
Great Famine. Despite its limits and defects, Cormac Ó Gráda – one of the greatest 
specialists of the Famine – presents it as ‘a pioneering and an enduring work’, and it 
was in fact republished in 1994.31 Several chapters remain essential reading for 
anyone interested in the subject, and that by Roger J. McHugh draws on oral 
tradition – ‘an unusual step at the time’32 – in order to understand how the Famine 
was experienced and remembered by ordinary people. 
The book has been the object of considerable criticism in recent years, 
however. The editors have come under attack for their laickadaisical approach to 
their work, which is seen as indicating their lack of interest in it: some chapters and 
footnotes were mislaid for instance, which contributed to its late publication, and 
they did very little writing themselves, Kevin Nowlan being asked to ghostwrite the 
foreword for them. Their revisionism has also been seen as a manifestation of 
Anglophilia, rather than as part of a truly value-free approach to Irish history. Colm 
Tóibín, who had had them as teachers during his student days, has cruelly depicted 
them as suffering from a postcolonial complex:  
It was clear from their bearing, the timbre of their voices and their 
general interest in source material that their time in British 
universities had been very important for them, that they were happier 
reading Hansard than going through lists of the names of people who 
                                                          
27 Theodore William MOODY, ‘Irish History and Irish Mythology’ [1978], pp. 71-86 in 
Ciaran BRADY (ed.), Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism, 
Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994. 
28 Cormac Ó GRÁDA, Ireland before and after the Famine: Explorations in economic 
history, 1800-1925, Manchester: Manchester UP, 1988, p. 78.  
29 It was only published in 1956, with T. D. Williams replacing Moody who had resigned in 
1946. 
30 COMERFORD, ‘Grievance, Scourge or Shame?’, op. cit.,  p. 60. 
31 Cormac Ó GRÁDA, ‘Introduction to the New Edition’, p. xxiv in DUDLEY EDWARDS 
and WILLIAMS, The Great Famine, op. cit. 
32 Melissa FEGAN, Literature and the Irish Famine, 1845-1919, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002, 
pp. 12-13. 
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died on coffin ships. It was equally clear that they would never have 
edited a book about the Famine had they not been commissioned to do 
so.33 
Joseph Lee, who is more appreciative of their contribution to the standards of 
Irish historical writing, reminds his readers that at the time ‘external examiners in all 
Irish universities came from England’ and that Irish historians therefore ‘tended to 
internalise the assumptions of English historiography’.34 Among those assumptions, 
there were the ‘wild flights of exotic Celtic fancy’, especially when it came to the 
supposed number of victims of British rule in Ireland. To counter that image, they 
would have naturally presented work of great ‘sobriety’. But Lee also acknowledges 
the inadequacies of the book, in particular the lack of any chapter on population. As 
to Ó Gráda, he has underlined its excessive focus on the administrative aspects of 
the Famine with the resulting risk of a ‘dehydrated history’, of which Dudley 
Edwards was quite aware.35 More generally, The Great Famine downplayed the 
responsibility of the British government, stressing the conditions that gave rise to an 
inevitable famine and concluding somewhat lamely on the issue of culpability: 
if modern research cannot substantiate the traditional [interpretation] 
in all its forms, something surely more sobering emerges which is, 
perhaps, of greater value towards an appreciation of the problems that 
beset all mankind, both the governors and the governed in every 
generation. If man, the prisoner of time, acts in conformity with the 
conventions of society into which he is born, it is difficult to judge him 
with an irrevocable harshness. So it is with the men of the famine era. 
Human limitations and timidity dominate the story of the Great 
Famine, but of great and deliberately imposed evil in high positions of 
responsibility there is little evidence. The really great evil lay in the 
totality of that social order which made such a famine possible and 
which could tolerate, to the extent it did, the suffering and hardship 
caused by the failure of the potato crop.36  
Another reason why The Great Famine has sometimes been criticised is linked 
to Dudley Edwards’ patronising attitude towards Cecil Woodham-Smith, an amateur 
British historian who wrote The Great Hunger shortly after, in 1962. Her account of 
the Great Famine puts much of the blame for the catastrophe on Trevelyan and 
generally underscores the responsibility of the British government, notably after 
Peel left office: 
Adherence to laissez-faire was carried to such a length that in the 
midst of one of the major famines of history, the government was 
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perpetually nervous of being too good to Ireland and of corrupting the 
Irish people by kindness, and so stifling the virtues of self-reliance and 
industry. In addition hearts were hardened by the antagonism then felt 
by the English towards the Irish, an antagonism rooted far back in 
religious and political history, and at the period of the famine 
irritation had been added as well.37  
From this perspective, it may be considered as more nationalist than The Great 
Famine, although Woodham-Smith was careful to explicitly reject any accusation of 
genocide. Critical reception in Ireland was initially lukewarm, as academic 
historians deplored its lack of detachment and its excessive focus on narrative rather 
than analysis. F. S. L. Lyons, then a senior lecturer in history at Trinity College 
Dublin, stated that he came out of it with a ‘sense of dissatisfaction’ because it 
lacked ‘depth’ and ‘humility’, the hallmarks of ‘the true historian’.38 In 1963, history 
students at University College Dublin, where Dudley Edwards was based, were 
famously invited to write an essay on the theme: ‘The Great Hunger is a great 
novel’.39 It was nonetheless based on a number of archival sources that had been 
neglected until then, like Trevelyan’s papers, and it turned out to be the ‘most widely 
read Irish history book of all time’.40 It has had a lasting influence on many scholars 
and it remains a useful book to this day.41  
Over the following three decades, few works dealing specifically with the 
Great Famine were published in Ireland. Mary Daly’s The Famine in Ireland was 
one of the exceptions; although a textbook aimed primarily at students, it provided a 
comprehensive account of the Famine’s economic context and outlined possibilities 
for further research. Yet it came under attack by some for its excessively detached 
tone and for the fact that it seemed to bend over backwards to protect the British 
Government’s record: ‘it remains difficult to conclusively argue that greater 
sympathy with the Irish case would automatically have guaranteed a dramatically 
reduced mortality’.42 In the same way, Theo Hoppen, while conceding that the 
government’s response during the Famine had been ‘extremely inefficient, grudging, 
and limited’, raised the question whether any democratic state could have ‘achieved 
a great deal more’.43 He also emphasised the numerous obstacles to relief, such as 
the lack of a developed retailing and distribution network, and considered it unlikely 
that a Dublin-based government could have done much better. As to Roy Foster, he 
considered that the status of the Famine had been exaggerated, and that if there was 
indeed a ‘watershed in nineteenth-century Irish social and economic history,’ it was 
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‘not 1846 but 1815, with the agricultural disruption following the end of the French 
wars.’44 
The great silence 
In 1981, a book assessing recent Irish historiography contained only a handful 
of references to the Great Famine, thus underlining the dearth of significant research 
into the Great Famine before that date.45 How can this avoidance of the subject be 
explained, given that the Famine was one of the major events of 19th-century 
Ireland, with long-lasting impact on Irish society? The Irish are famous for their 
interest in – some might say their obsession with – their own history, but in this case 
they long avoided coming to terms with the Great Famine. Several reasons have 
been proposed. There may be a shame linked to famine memories, as suggested 
among others by John Killen:  
The trauma of the famine decade struck a deep blow to the psyche of 
the Irish people then and in ensuing generations. Anger, hatred, fear 
and compassion have mixed with shame to produce a reluctance, 
possibly an inability, to address the enormity of that national tragedy. 
It is possible that only now, in the last years of the century and of the 
millennium have the people of Ireland the self-confidence to seek to 
understand fully the causes, progress and consequences of the famine 
decade.46 
Indeed, many famine survivors would have reluctant to admit that they had 
worked on public works, or begged for food, or spent months in a workhouse – ‘all 
actions that in post-famine Ireland might have detracted from their standing in the 
community or from the way in which they wished their status to be perceived’.47 As 
to relatives of people dead of hunger, the shame would have been at least as strong, 
to the point that such cases may well have been underreported, much like suicides 
today. Faced with utter destitution, many families bolted their doors and lay down to 
die within their cabins, while others crawled into the corner of a graveyard to die on 
consecrated ground. The feelings of insecurity attached to such memories would 
hardly have encouraged further inquiries. Families were forced to decide who would 
eat and who would not; some abandoned their children in workhouses and 
emigrated, hoping to be able to send money for the children’s fare later. Those who 
survived would have felt almost unbearable guilt, leading to ‘famine denial’.48 In 
some cases, hunger may have pushed individuals to  extremes like cannibalism, a 
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taboo that would have also contributed to a collective amnesia or at the very least an 
unwillingness to confront the past.49 
In the same way, some aspects of the Famine were awkward insofar as they 
challenged the dominant nationalist narrative of Protestant landlords pitted against 
Catholic tenants, or of British ministers determined to decimate the Irish. There were 
in fact several dimensions to the struggle for land prevalent in Ireland at the time, 
and if those which conformed to the nationalist interpretation were given pride of 
place, those involving struggles among Catholic Irishmen – between agricultural 
labourers and strong farmers for instance – were so problematic that ‘the only safe 
course was amnesia’, as Joseph Lee has indicated.50 A number of merchants and 
traders also made profits at the time, notably those who lent money at usurious rates 
of interest. There is a tension therefore between the dominant nationalist discourse 
and the fact that a number of Catholics benefited from the situation. Colm Tóibín 
has underlined the fact that in the aftermath of the Famine, divisions within the 
‘Irish nation’ – especially class divisions – were passed under silence, while blame 
was focused on the English and the Ascendancy.  
Such a reaction may be quite natural, yet the underlying trauma remains, 
notably in the western parts of the island which suffered the most and where some 
people ‘claim to be haunted still by the silences and absences and emptiness that the 
Famine left’.51 If that statement seems to stretch the limits of credulity, a statement 
by the Taoiseach in May 2014 during the National Famine Commemoration may be 
worth reporting. Speaking in Strokestown, Co. Roscommon, which lost 60% of its 
population during the Famine through death and emigration, Enda Kenny referred to 
the strength of Famine atavisms today:  
As their descendants, we carry the generational memory of An Gorta 
Mor, deep within us. It’s in how we stop momentarily when we hear 
summer blight warnings on the radio; it’s in the coldness in the back of 
the neck at the particular smell of a bag of potatoes that has spent too 
long in the cupboard.52  
Kenny, who was himself born in Co. Mayo, in the West, may have been 
expressing an important fact concerning the impact of the Famine on the Irish 
psyche, which would have contributed to a reluctance to dwell on the event.  
Another factor that must be taken into account is the context in Northern 
Ireland. During the conflict (1968-1998), most Irish historians became wary of 
providing any academic legitimacy to the IRA, which was then waging a deadly 
campaign against the Union on the basis of a colonial narrative of Anglo-Irish 
history. There is a fairly clear correlation between the Northern Irish conflict and the 
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rise of revisionism in the 1970s: while republicans endorsed Mitchel’s view of the 
Famine as a genocide, most historians sought to distance themselves from that 
position. Mary Daly admitted for instance in 1995 having downplayed the level of 
mortality as well as the responsibility of the British Government during the Great 
Famine because of her unwillingness to seem to support the republican agenda.53  
The sesquicentenary 
The importance of that factor seems to be confirmed by the coincidence of the 
first IRA ceasefire in 1994 and the 150th anniversary of the Famine in 1995, which 
resulted in an outpouring of books on the subject. The sesquicentenary thus 
combined with new hopes for peace in Northern Ireland, which allowed historians to 
study the Famine with greater intellectual freedom than before: the ‘parity of 
esteem’ enshrined in the peace process could also apply to diverging historical 
schools. In addition, historians wrote in a context that was transformed by a thawing 
in Anglo-Irish relations after Tony Blair became Prime Minister. Determined to 
secure a lasting peace settlement in Northern Ireland, he communicated a statement 
on 31 May 1997 through the British ambassador in Dublin, which was read on the 
following day by Gabriel Byrne, a famous Irish actor, at a Great Famine 
commemoration in Millstreet, Co. Cork – 
The Famine was a defining event in the history of Ireland and of 
Britain. It has left deep scars. That one million people should have 
died in what was then part of the richest and most powerful nation in 
the world is something that still causes pain as we reflect on it today. 
Those who governed in London at the time failed their people through 
standing by while a crop failure turned into a massive tragedy. We 
must not forget such as dreadful event.54 
This official apology allowed Irish historians to look at Britain’s role in the 
Famine without any pressure to minimise its responsibility in order to avoid the 
charge of Anglophobia.55 Scholars from other countries or other fields, who were 
less constrained by such considerations, had already made significant contributions 
to the understanding of the Great Famine. Joel Mokyr, an American economic 
historian, published an important book in 1983, Why Ireland Starved, which 
proposed a novel approach based on econometric methods. Among his sometimes 
controversial conclusions, he refuted claims that Ireland was overpopulated prior to 
the Famine; as to his assessment of British policy, it seemed to bolster the nationalist 
case: 
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Most serious of all, when the chips were down in the frightful summer 
of 1847, the British simply abandoned the Irish and let them perish. 
There is no doubt that Britain could have saved Ireland. The British 
treasury spent a total of about £9.5 million on famine relief. […] A few 
years after the famine, the British government spent £69.3 million on 
an utterly futile adventure in the Crimea. Half that sum spent in 
Ireland in the critical years 1846-9 would have saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives. […] It is not unreasonable to surmise that had 
anything like the famine occurred in England or Wales, the British 
government would have overcome its theoretical scruples and would 
have come to the rescue of the starving at a much larger scale. Ireland 
was not considered part of the British community.56  
Another academic based in the United States, James S. Donnelly, Jr., 
contributed several chapters in the New History of Ireland volume devoted to the 
1801-70 period, highlighting among others the limits of British relief policy.57 As to 
Cormac Ó Gráda, his background in economics allowed him to approach the Famine 
from an angle different to that of other historians, and his abundant and wide-
ranging work since the late 1980s has played a major role in renewing Famine 
research. He has contributed decisively to the ‘emergence, from the mid-1990s 
onwards, of a new generation of famine interpretation that is post-revisionist while 
continuing to challenge the excesses and simplifications of earlier nationalistic 
interpretations’.58 
It is hardly possible to sum up all the new paths for research opened by post-
revisionists here, but a few points may be outlined.59 For instance, the conventional 
wisdom according to which Irish agriculture was characterised by its backwardness 
has been challenged by several historians. Some have underlined the major 
developments that occurred between the late 18th century and the 1840s, which 
indicate that Ireland adapted itself quickly to new circumstances, in accordance with 
the specific nature of its geography and the constitutional framework of the Union.60 
The fact that Ireland was able simultaneously to feed a rapidly expanding population 
and to increase its agricultural exports to Britain during the first half of the 19th 
century reflects a performance which should not be minimised – according to Ó 
Gráda, Irish agricultural production ‘presumably doubled’ between 1800 and 1845, 
no mean feat.61 As to David Lloyd, he has argued that British norms of modernity 
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have led to a misunderstanding of Irish realities: the communal or ‘rundale’ system 
of farming was perfectly suited to the poorer lands of the West, as well as helping to 
maintain a strong cultural life within small clusters of houses known as clachans.62  
Ó Gráda has shown that Ireland was changing prior to the Famine, notably 
from a demographic point of view, and that, had the blight occurred a couple of 
decades later, it could well have escaped its catastrophic effects. In other words the 
Great Famine was not an inevitable event due to a Malthusian dead-end in which 
Irish society was allegedly stuck, but an external shock of great magnitude which 
could not be foreseen.63 Ó Gráda has engaged in comparative work as well, 
establishing that the Great Famine was probably the deadliest of all famines in 
recorded history proportionally to the population – with the possible exception of the 
insufficiently documented 1740-41 Irish famine –, and has built on the theories of 
Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen, whose work on famines in India and Bengal 
suggests that famines are due less to shortages of food than to issues of entitlement 
to existing stocks.  
Peter Gray has studied in great detail the ideological background against which 
British ministers and officials devised policies for Ireland, concluding that laissez-
faire, providentialism and moralism were three major concepts which guided their 
reactions to the Famine.64 The influence of the Manchester school of economics, 
which was considerable at the time, militated against State intervention in the 
economy. It was linked to some extent to providentialism, the doctrine that human 
affairs are regulated by divine agency for human good, in the sense that the 
workings of the market were seen as reflecting the judgement of God. This in turn 
was connected to moralism, the idea that the root of Ireland’s problems was to be 
found in the people’s improvidence, irresponsibility and laziness.  
Yet providentialism was a protean concept with many nuances and degrees. 
Ministers and officials – as well as the Irish – agreed on the whole that the Famine 
was a ‘visitation by God’, though their interpretations varied considerably. For Peel 
and Graham, it required decisive action on the part of the government; for Wood, 
Senior and Trevelyan, it was an opportunity to end Ireland’s misery by transforming 
its social and economic structures.65 As to the Irish, many saw it as a punishment for 
their sins, while Daniel O’Connell saw it as a test of charity within the British Isles.  
Donal Kerr has focused on the role of the Churches, in particular that of the 
Catholic Church.66 In 1847 O’Connell supported Lord John Russell because of the 
‘justice for Ireland’ policy he had led in previous years, yet the Whig administration 
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failed to achieve its ambition to assimilate Ireland within the United Kingdom, 
partly because of the religious divide between Ireland and Great Britain. Evictions 
and growing violence – notably the murder of Major Denis Mahon in  November 
1847 – led to denunciations of the Catholic clergy in the British press,67 and a 
number of priests in turn joined the Young Ireland movement. At the same time, 
several Protestant organisations sought to use the Famine to convert Irish Catholics 
in exchange for food, thus fuelling religious tensions. As to the Vatican’s decision to 
re-establish an episcopal hierarchy in Britain in 1850, it provoked a wave of anti-
Catholic hysteria, with Westminster passing the 1851 Ecclesiastical Titles Bill in 
retaliation.  
Christine Kinealy has focused among others on the issue of food exports. Most 
historians agree that Ireland imported more food than it exported after 1847 and that 
a ban on exports might thus have been counterproductive, without mentioning its 
political difficulties, grain producers and merchants being a powerful lobby. Austin 
Bourke for instance studied official trade figures for grain and concluded that the 
retention of home-grown food could have served ‘only as a temporary device to win 
time’.68 But Kinealy has underlined that those official statistics are not entirely 
reliable, that one must also take into account other agricultural exports – dairy 
products, livestock, etc. –, and that even a limited amount of food would have made 
all the difference in the world for many hungry people at a crucial moment during 
the Famine.69  
Conclusion 
In 1996, while assessing the state of research on the Great Famine, Mary Daly 
concluded by calling for a new approach, characterised by ‘a blend of analysis and 
emotion’ in order to ‘meet the needs of scholarship and popular memory alike’70 – in 
other words, an approach reconciling the empathy of nationalist narratives and the 
detachment of scholarly history or, if one wishes, overcoming both the 
administrative aridity of Charles Trevelyan and the passionate outrage of John 
Mitchel. Two writers may well have come close to fitting that exacting description. 
Ciaran Ó Murchadha has combined scholarly research and first-hand accounts in his 
book, Ireland’s Agony, thus achieving a valuable balance between historical analysis 
and the human interest angle.71 As to Enda Delaney, he has also proposed an 
innovative book, The Curse of Reason, in which the lives of four actors of the 
Famine are intertwined, thus offering a multifaceted view of the event: in addition to 
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many secondary sources, he builds on the contemporary writings of Trevelyan, 
Mitchel, Elizabeth Smith – the wife of a Protestant landlord, who held a detailed 
diary – and John McHale, the combative nationalist Archbishop of Tuam, to depict 
Ireland in all of its complexity during the Famine.72  
If studies of the Great Famine were all too scarce before the 1990s, partly 
because of unresolved issues linked to generational memories of the catastrophe and 
of the conflictual legacy of Anglo-Irish relations,73 they have become very abundant, 
diverse and wide-ranging since then, offering many new perspectives. They have 
been accompanied by official commemorations, reflecting growing public interest in 
the Famine in recent years. Since 2008 for instance, an annual National Famine 
Memorial Day is organised under the auspices of the Government, with a parallel 
event held abroad to emphasise the links with the Irish diaspora.74 Indeed, if the 
Famine is essential to an understanding of Irish history – and from that point of view 
one can only salute the great vitality of Famine studies in recent years –, it also 
constitutes a significant aspect of the history of several English-speaking countries 
in the world. 
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